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Abstract: 
Most customers in electricity markets do not face prices that change frequently to reflect changes in wholesale 
costs, known as real-time pricing (RTP). We show that not only does time-invariant pricing in competitive 
markets lead to prices and investment that are not first best, it even fails to achieve the constrained second-best 
optimum. Increasing the share of customers on RTP is likely to improve efficiency, though surprisingly it does 
not necessarily reduce capacity investment, and it is likely to harm customers that are already on RTP. 
Simulations demonstrate that the efficiency gains from RTP are potentially quite significant. 
 
Article: 
1. Introduction 
In many industries , retail prices do not adjust quickly to changes in costs or market conditions . Restaurants 
keep stable menu prices on most dishes even when ingredient prices fluctuate.
1
 Service providers, from barbers 
to veterinarians, regulate fluctuating demand with nonprice mechanisms (usually queuing) rather than by 
adjusting price to clear the market in times of excess demand. 
 
Perhaps nowhere is the disconnect between retail pricing and wholesale costs so great as in restructured 
electricity markets. In the last decade it has become apparent that wholesale electricity price fluctuations can be 
extreme, but retail prices have in nearly all cases been adjusted only very gradually. Typically, wholesale 
electricity prices vary hour by hour, while retail prices are adjusted two or three times per year. Because 
electricity is not economically storable and fixed retail prices create price-inelastic wholesale demand, it is not 
uncommon for wholesale prices within one day to vary by 100% or more while retail prices do not adjust at all. 
 
Economists, recognizing the potential inefficiencies when prices do not reflect incremental production or 
wholesale acquisition costs , have been among the most vocal proponents of real-time pricing (RTP) of 
electricity, under which retail prices can change very frequently, usually hourly. With the 2000-01 California 
electricity crisis, many market participants also expressed support for more responsive retail prices. RTP has 
been explored in economics in what is commonly referred to as the peak-load pricing literature.
2
 That literature, 
however, has focused almost entirely on time-varying pricing in a regulated market. Much of what is known 
from that literature carries over immediately to a deregulated market if all customers are on RTP, but that 
situation is unlikely to occur in any electricity system in the near future. 
 
While many deregulated (and some regulated) electricity markets are considering implementing RTP for some 
customers, nowhere is RTP likely to encompass all, or even most, of the retail demand. In all cases, the outcome 
is likely to be a hybrid in which some customers see real-time prices and others see time-invariant prices, more 
commonly called flat-rate service. In this article we examine such a structure under deregulation, where 
competitive generation markets develop time-varying wholesale prices, but competitive retail sellers still charge 
some customers flat retail rates.
3,4
 
Closely tied to time-invariant retail pricing is the issue of investment adequacy.
5
 Many participants in the 
electricity industry have argued, generally without much economic explanation, that deregulated electricity 
markets will result in inadequate investment in production capacity. While this clearly is not the case with peak-
load pricing under regulation — as explained by the earlier literature — and similarly does not result from a 
model of competitive electricity markets in which all customers are on RTP, we show that capacity investment 
is not efficient in competitive markets when some customers are on flat retail rates. Not only is the level of 
investment not the first-best level that results when all customers are on RTP, it is not even the second-best 
optimal level of capacity investment, given the constraint that some customers cannot be charged real-time 
prices. 
 
Those who have argued that capacity investment will be suboptimal under deregulation have generally then 
advocated for capacity subsidies in order to support greater capacity investment. We analyze a number of 
possible proposals for capacity subsidies and demonstrate that commonly proposed policies cannot overcome 
the inefficiency caused by suboptimal investment. 
 
We then analyze the impact of expanding the use of RTP. We show that if customers have homogeneous 
demand patterns, expansion of RTP actually harms customers who are already on RTP, but benefits customers 
who remain on flat rates. We demonstrate that incremental changes in the use of RTP have impacts on the 
efficiency of the market that are not captured by those changing to RTP, an externality that implies the incentive 
to switch to RTP will not in general be optimal. We also show, surprisingly, that increasing use of RTP will not 
necessarily reduce the equilibrium amount of installed generation capacity. In the following section, we present 
preliminary estimates of the magnitude of the distortion resulting from flat-rate pricing in electricity. Using 
realistic parameters for costs and demand, we find that a lower-bound estimate of the inefficiency is probably 5-
10% of wholesale energy costs. 
 
We focus in this article on the electricity industry, but the results have implications well beyond electricity. Due 
to technologies or institutions, retail prices in many markets are smoothed representations of underlying 
wholesale costs. Our results demonstrate that this sort of pricing has significant implications for capital 
investment and long-run efficiency, particularly in service industries and other markets with little or no ability 
to carry inventories.
6
 
 
We begin in Section 2 by presenting a model of competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets in which 
some share of customers is able to be charged real-time electricity prices. We demonstrate the short-run pricing 
and long-run investment inefficiency that results from the inability to charge all customers real-time prices. We 
also show that subsidies or taxes that have been suggested to overcome these inefficiencies cannot generally 
correct the problem. In Section 3 we examine the welfare effects of changing the proportion of customers on 
RTP and the customer's incentives to switch to RTP. In Section 4 we describe the basic simulations we have 
carried out to evaluate the magnitude of these inefficiencies and show that they are likely to be significant 
compared to the total costs of operating the system. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Competition in wholesale and retail electricity markets 
In deregulated electricity markets , wholesale prices are envisioned to result from competition among 
generators, and retail prices would result from competition among retail service providers serving the final 
customers. To understand these competitive interactions, consider the following model of electricity markets. 
 
Since electricity cannot be stored economically, demand must equal supply at all times. Assume there are T 
periods per day with retail demand in period t given by Dt(P), where   
  < 0.
7
 A fraction, α, of the customers 
pay real-time prices, i.e., retail prices that vary hour to hour. The remaining fraction of customers, 1 — α, pay a 
flat retail price   . We assume that α   (0, 1] is exogenous and that customers on real-time pricing do not differ 
systematically from those on flat-rate pricing.
8,9
 Aggregate (wholesale) demand from the customers is then   t(p, 
  ) = αDt(p)+ (1 — α)Dt(  ), which implies that   t is decreasing in   and p. Note that   t(    ) = Dt(  ). For p > 
  , the flat-rate customers do not decrease consumption in response to the higher real-time price, so   t (p,   ) > 
Dt(p), and for p <   , the flat-rate customers do not increase consumption in response to the lower real-time 
price, so   t(p,   ) < Dt(p). Finally,   t (p,   ) is decreasing in α for p >   , and   t(p,   ) is increasing in α for p <   . 
That is, increasing alpha increases the elasticity of wholesale demand by rotating   t around the point (Dt(        
 
Figure 1 illustrates the wholesale demand curves if everyone were on RTP, Dt (solid lines), and if 1 — α share 
of customers were on flat-rate service,   t (dashed lines), where there are only two periods: the high-peak 
period, H, and the low off-peak period, L. Note that the less-elastic curves are the aggregate wholesale demand 
when some customers are on flat-rate service. For prices above   , wholesale quantity demanded is greater than 
the quantity demanded if everyone were on real-time prices, since the flat-rate customers do not decrease 
consumption in response to the higher real-time price. Similarly, for prices below p, wholesale quantity 
demanded is less than the quantity demanded if everyone were on real-time prices, since the flat-rate customers 
do not increase consumption in response to the lower real-time price. 
 
Generators install capacity and sell electricity in the wholesale market. Assume that each generator is small 
relative to the market and has access to identical technology. Assume that the marginal costs of each generator 
are continuous and increasing in output.
10
 Since marginal costs are increasing and each generator has the 
identical technology, industry costs are minimized when production from each generator is identical. Let C(q, 
K) be the short-run industry variable cost of generating q units of electricity given that K units of capacity are 
installed. Assume that the partial derivatives, Cq and Ck, are continuous and that 
 
(i) Cq > 0, for a given K , increasing generation output increases variable costs; 
 
(ii) Ck < 0, variable costs of generating a given quantity of electricity is lower with more installed 
capacity; 
 
(iii) Cqq > 0, short-run marginal costs are increasing in quantity; 
 
(iv) Ckk > 0, the reduction in short-run generation costs from installing additional capacity is smaller at 
higher levels of installed capacity, i.e., —Ck is downward sloping in K; and 
 
(v) Cqk < 0, additional investment reduces the marginal cost of generating. 
 
Profit maximization implies that each firm would equate its short-run marginal cost of generation with the 
wholesale price so that, since all firms are identical, wt = Cq(q, K), where wt is the wholesale price in period t. 
Thus, the short-run industry supply curve is upward sloping.
11
 Figure 2 illustrates demand curves for six 
different time periods and two short-run industry supply curves for capacities K and K' , where K < K' . Market-
clearing prices for each time period are given by the intersection of the demand curves with the relevant short-
run supply curve. In the long run, investment that increases capacity from K to K' lowers the marginal cost of 
generation and lowers the market-clearing price in each period. 
 
In the long run, generators can add or retire capacity. Assume that the cost per unit of capacity is r per day. If qt 
megawatts of electricity are generated in period t, industry profits for the generators are       wtqt – C(qt, K)] – 
rK per day. Since each firm has identical technology and generates the same amount per unit of capacity, firm 
profit is simply a fraction of industry profit. 
 
The retail sector purchases electricity from generators in the wholesale market and distributes it to the final 
customers. Firms in the retail sector are assumed to have no costs other than the wholesale cost of the electricity 
that they buy for their retail customers.
12
 The retail firms choose real-time retail prices, pt , and the flat retail 
rate,   , engaging in Bertrand competition over these prices. Bertrand competition represents accurately the 
competition among retail electricity providers, because they would be price takers in the wholesale market, 
would be selling a nearly homogeneous product in the retail market, and would face no real capacity 
constraints. Profit of the retail sector is given by         - wt )(1 – α)Dt (   + (pt – wt)αDt(pt) per day.
13
 Since 
electricity cannot be stored economically, demand greater than capacity in any period would require nonprice 
rationing. The flat retail price,   , is feasible if there exists some pt such that Cq(  t (pt ,   ), K) <  for all t, i.e., 
if the marginal cost of producing the quantity demanded is finite. In other words,    is feasible if enough 
customers are on RTP to allow the wholesale market to clear at some finite price.
14
 
 
Competitive equilibrium in wholesale and retail markets. Equilibrium prices in the retail sector are 
determined by competition among retailers. First, consider the customers on RTP. If a real-time price, pt, were 
greater than the wholesale price, a competing retailer could make profits by undercutting pt and attracting more 
customers. Since charging a price less than wt would imply losses, the equilibrium short-run retail real-time 
price is     
  = wt for every t. In other words, competition among retailers drives retail prices for RTP customers 
to be equal to wholesale prices in each period. 
 
Similarly, competition forces the flat retail rate to be set to cover exactly the cost of providing electricity to the 
flat-rate customers. Since this implies zero profits for the retail sector, the condition          
  - wt)(1 – 
α)Dt(    
 ) = 0 determines the short-run equilibrium flat retail price     
 . Note that this zero-profit condition can 
be written     
  = [ Tt =1 wt Dt(    
  / [ Tt =1Dt(    
     In other words , the equilibrium flat retail price is a 
weighted average of the real-time wholesale prices where the weights are the relative quantities demanded by 
the customers facing a flat retail price. Thus, competition among retailers drives     
  to be equal to the demand-
weighted average wholesale price.
15
 
 
In the short run, equilibrium prices in the wholesale market are determined by the intersection of the demand 
curve and the short-run supply curve in each period. Since generators equate the marginal cost of generation 
with the wholesale price in every period, supply equals demand when wt = Cq(  t(pt,   ), K).
16
 We then have the 
following. 
 
Characterization of short-run competitive equilibrium. For a given capacity, K , and a given share of 
customers on real-time pricing, α, the short-run competitive equilibrium is characterized by real-time retail 
prices   
  =   
  and flat-rate retail price   e = [    
   
 Dt(  
e
)]/[     
 Dt(  
e
)]. The equilibrium wholesale (real-
time) prices are determined by   
  = Cq(  t(  
 ,   ), K) for every t. 
 
In the long run, generation capacity will enter (exit) the wholesale market as long as profits are positive 
(negative). Thus, competitive investment drives long-run profits to zero. Due to symmetry, this can be written 
as a zero-profit condition on the wholesale sector, i.e.,     
 [wtqt – C(qt , K)] - r K = 0. Thus, we have the 
following. 
 
Characterization of long-run competitive equilibrium. For a given share of customers on RTP, α ,  
the long-run competitive-equilibrium wholesale prices are characterized by the conditions characterizing a 
short-run competitive equilibrium plus the additional condition      
 [  
   t(  
 ,   ) - C(  t(  
 ,   ), K)] = r K.17 
 
(In)efficiency of competitive equilibrium. The First Welfare Theorem ensures efficiency of the competitive 
equilibrium under certain conditions.
18
 However, the requirements of the welfare theorems are not met if α < 1, 
since there is a missing market. Customers on flat retail prices cannot trade with customers on real-time prices 
or with producers, because all electricity transactions must occur at the same price for flat-rate customers. 'This 
missing market implies that the competitive equilibrium discussed above may not be efficient. 
 
However, if all customers face the real-time prices, i.e., α = 1, then the competitive equilibrium is Pareto 
efficient. Pareto efficiency follows immediately once α = 1 because there is no missing market and all of the 
conditions of the First Welfare Theorem are satisfied. This implies that there is short-run allocative efficiency 
and long-run efficiency of capacity investments. 
 
To see this in our particular application, consider first the short-run equilibrium. Since α = 1,   t = Dt  for every 
t. The equilibrium condition   
  = Cq(Dt(  
 ), K) implies that the marginal cost of production is equal to the 
wholesale price in every period. Since all customers are on real-time pricing, wt is equal to the marginal utility 
of consumption for each customer. Since the marginal cost of generation equals the marginal utility of each 
customer in each time period, the short-run equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
 
For the long run, the marginal social value of capacity is given by the decrease in costs resulting from an 
increment to installed capacity. In period t, this decrease in costs is given by —Ck(Dt(pt), K). Since installing 
capacity decreases costs in all periods, the social optimum would dictate installing additional capacity as long as 
       k(Dtpt , K) > r and stopping investment when    
 
   k(Dt(pt) , K) = r .19 Recall that competition will 
lead to more investment as long as profits are positive, i.e.,       wtDt(pt) – C(Dt(pt) , K)] > r K , and investment 
ceases when       wtDt(pt) – C(Dt(pt) , K)] = r K . By differentiating the zero-profit condition with respect to K , 
we see that competition leads to additional investment if and only if it is efficient. Thus, private incentives for 
investment accurately reflect social incentives, and the long-run competitive equilibrium is efficient when all 
customers are on real-time pricing. 
 
If some customers do not face the real-time prices, α < 1, the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto efficient, i.e., 
does not attain the first-best electricity allocation and capacity investment. To see this, consider the short run in 
which K is fixed. Recall that competition among retailers drives retail prices for RTP customers to be equal to 
wholesale prices in each period and drives   to be equal to the demand-weighted average wholesale price. 
Equilibrium wholesale prices are determined by supply and demand (  t) in every period. This short-run 
equilibrium is clearly not first best because in almost all hours flat-rate customers are not charged a price equal 
to the industry marginal cost. 
While it is clear that flat-rate retail pricing will not yield the first-best resource allocation, there is still a 
question of what flat rate minimizes the resulting deadweight loss. In particular, does the competitive-
equilibrium flat rate,     
  , attain a second best by minimizing the deadweight loss associated with having flat-
rate customers? To answer this question, consider the flat retail rate,     
  , and real-time prices      
  that 
minimize deadweight loss in the short run.     
  and      
  can be found from the optimization 
 
where the consumer surplus measure   t is defined by   t (p ,   )   αUt(Dt(p))+ (1 — α)Ut(Dt(  )) and Ut maps 
quantities into the usual consumer surplus. 
 
We refer to the result of this optimization as the second-best optimal allocation.
20
 The optimization can be 
described by two first-order conditions. 
 
For the optimal real-time price in period t, the first-order condition is 
 
Thus, the flat retail price that minimizes the deadweight loss is a weighted average of the real-time prices where 
the weights are the relative slopes of the demand curves.
21
 Since     
  is also a weighted average of the real-time 
prices but with different weights, we have the following. 
 
Theorem la (nonattainment of the second best in the short run). The short-run competitive equilibrium does 
not in general attain the second-best optimal electricity allocation. Furthermore, the equilibrium flat rate,     
  , 
can be either higher or lower than optimal. 
 
Proof. Since both     
  and     
  are weighted averages of the pt but their weights are not necessarily equal, 
comparison of the two weighted averages implies that     
  does not necessarily equal     
 . We can construct an 
example where     
  is higher (lower) than optimal by making the   
 (  ) arbitrarily large (small) for all t such 
that Dt(  ) > K S(  ) and the   
 (  ) arbitrarily small (large) for all t such that Dt(  ) < K S(  ). Q.ED. 
 
To illustrate that the equilibrium flat retail price may be either too high or too low, consider a simple example 
with two time periods: high-demand peak, H, and low-demand off-peak, L. Clearly, the competitive-equilibrium 
flat rate is less than the peak real-time price and greater than the off-peak price. If peak demand were perfectly 
inelastic, i.e., if   
  = 0, and if off-peak demand exhibited some elasticity, then the optimal flat rate would place 
no weight on the peak period price and all weight on the off-peak price. The competitive-equilibrium flat rate is 
then higher than optimal, since decreasing the flat rate does not change consumption on peak but reduces the 
consumption distortion off peak. Conversely, if   
  = 0 and   
   < 0, then the optimal flat rate places no weight 
on the off-peak price and the competitive flat rate is too low. Now, increasing the flat rate does not change 
consumption off peak but reduces the consumption distortion on peak. 
 
Interestingly, if all demands have the same elasticity at   e, then   e =   *. To see this, note that if demands in two 
periods, i and j, have the same elasticity at p, then 
 
Thus, a weighted average of wholesale prices using as weights the flat-rate quantities will be the same as a 
weighted average using as weights the demand slopes at those flat-rate quantities, i.e.,   e =   *. Furthermore, this 
shows that if the elasticity at   in period i is greater than the elasticity in period j, then   
 (  )/  
 (  ) > 
Di(  )/Dj(  ). Therefore, the weighted average, using slopes as weights, puts more relative weight on the more-
elastic periods. Thus, if the high-demand periods are relatively more (less) elastic, then the equilibrium flat rate 
is lower (higher) than optimal. 
 
Inefficiency in the long run. In the long run, supply and demand are equated by the real-time wholesale prices; 
retail competition forces pt = wt for every t; the equilibrium flat retail price,     
 , is determined by retail 
competition; and equilibrium capacity,    
  , is determined by wholesale competition. Because of the flat retail 
price, the first-best outcome is not achieved in either capacity investment or production. 
 
To determine the second-best optimum in the long run, consider the flat retail rate,     
  , real-time prices,     
  , 
and capacity,    
  , that minimize deadweight loss. The optimum can be found from the maximization in 
equation (1), where now optimization is also with respect to capacity. The first-order conditions for pt and   are 
given by (2) and (3), and the first-order condition for K is 
 
As in the short run, the second-best price,     
  , is a weighted average of the real-time prices where the weights 
are the relative slopes of the demand curves. The optimal real-time prices are determined by wt = Cq(  t(pt,   ), 
K) for every t. Note that equation (7) implies that at the second-best optimal capacity, the marginal cost 
reduction from an additional unit of investment is exactly equal to the daily cost of capital, so that each firm is 
investing to the point that it is earning zero profits net of capital costs. This implies that, given the second-best 
flat rate, competition in investment would lead to the second-best optimal capacity investment. 
 
As in the short run,     
  and     
  are different weighted averages of the real-time prices. Therefore,     
  is not 
generally equal to     
 , and the equilibrium flat price can be either too high or too low relative to the second 
best. This implies that the competitive equilibrium may lead to suboptimal installation of capacity as well. 
Therefore, we have the following. 
 
Theorem lb (nonattainment of the second best in the long run). The long-run competitive equilibrium does not 
in general attain the second-best optimal electricity allocation and capacity investment. Furthermore, the 
equilibrium flat rate,     
 , is higher than optimal, if and only if the equilibrium capacity investment,    
 , is 
smaller than optimal. 
 
Proof To see that    
  can be either larger or smaller than    
 , suppose that the slopes of the demand curves are 
such that     
  >     
 , i.e., the equilibrium flat price is too low. Further suppose that the market is in long-run 
equilibrium, and the planner tries to improve efficiency in the short run by increasing the flat retail price to     
 . 
In the short run, this would decrease demand   t in every period, so prices and consumption would fall. Since 
consumption has fallen, this implies that the cost reduction from an additional unit of capacity has decreased, 
i.e., —Ck has decreased since Cqk < 0. But this implies that Σ —Ck is now less than r , so to improve investment 
efficiency the planner would have to reduce capacity. This implies that the equilibrium long-run capacity was 
too large relative to the second-best optimal long-run capacity. A symmetric argument shows that    
  >    
  if 
and only if     
  <     
  (see Borenstein and Holland, 2003b). Q.ED. 
 
Although competition distorts the consumption of the flat-rate customers relative to the second best, 
competition does not introduce additional distortions into the real-time market or investment for a given flat 
rate. For a given p, the optimal real-time prices are determined by the first-order conditions from the planner's 
problem, which imply that pt = Cq(  t(pt ,   ), K) for every t. Note that these optimal prices are exactly the real-
time prices that would result from competition, given a p, namely, the prices such that supply equals demand. In 
addition, the condition      
  —Ck(  t(pt,   ), K) = r implies that there are no profits in investment. 
 
Although we have assumed that demand in each period depends only on the price in that period, Theorems la 
and lb can be extended to incorporate nonzero cross-price elasticities. To see this, first note that the 
characterization of the competitive equilibrium (namely as a quantity-weighted average of the wholesale prices) 
does not depend on the elasticities (slopes) of the demands, but rather on the quantities demanded at   e. This 
characterization would not change fundamentally if we assumed instead that demand in each period depended 
on the entire vector of (flat) prices. In other words , the equilibrium flat price would still depend only on the 
quantities demanded and not on own- or cross-price elasticities of demand. 
 
The second-best optimal flat price, derived by maximizing (1), would, however, depend on the own- and cross-
price elasticities of demand. The planner would recognize that raising the flat price would affect the quantity 
demanded in each period not only since the price in that period would be higher, but also because the price in all 
other periods would be higher. Thus   * would depend on the own- and cross-elasticities of demand.22 Since   e 
does not depend on the own- or cross-elasticities of demand, the second-best optimum would still not be 
attained by competition even when cross-price elasticities are nonzero. 
 
Finally, it is useful to distinguish Theorem 1 from the contestable-markets theory of the classic natural 
monopoly. First, that literature deals with the market failure due to nonexistence of a Walrasian competitive 
equilibrium. We analyze the market failure that results from flat-rate pricing when customers on flat-rate pricing 
cannot trade with customers on real-time pricing. Second, contestable equilibria, characterized by average cost 
pricing, do not attain the first best, but attain the second best where the planner is constrained to choose a price 
that achieves at least normal profit. If we were to define the profit-constrained second best as the flat price that 
maximized welfare subject to achieving normal profit, the competitive equilibrium still would not generally 
attain the profit-constrained second best. In particular, if   * >   e, then   * yields the retailers more than normal 
profit and competition still would not achieve the profit-constrained second best. On the other hand, if   * <   e , 
then   * does not yield a normal profit. In this case,   e would be the profit-constrained second best and would be 
attained by competition. 
 
Subsidies/taxes on capacity or electricity. In restructured wholesale electricity markets, many parties have 
suggested that in order to assure sufficient investment in generation, "capacity payments" to producers are 
necessary. These payments directly subsidize the holding of capacity, generally without a commitment on the 
producer's part to offer any certain quantity of energy or any certain price.
23
 Such payments can be seen as part 
of a general category of market interventions designed to move the equilibrium outcome closer to the 
constrained social optimum. In this subsection, we analyze such policies. 
 
Among such interventions, there are three characteristics that are central to the economic analysis of the policy. 
First, the subsidy/tax can be directed at the retail price of electricity or it can be directed at capacity. Second, the 
revenues from a subsidy/tax can flow to or from an external source (such as the government's general fund), or 
the scheme can operate on a balanced-budget basis with all revenues flowing to or from electricity customers. 
Finally, for any adjustment to retail rates, RTP and flat-rate customers may be treated symmetrically, or the 
tax/subsidy can apply to only one group. 
 
To see whether these policies can attain the second-best optimum, we characterize a long-run competitive 
equilibrium with a tax/subsidy on the RTP customers, τrtp ; a tax/subsidy on the flat-rate customers, τflat; and a 
tax/subsidy on capacity, σ.
24
 As above, the equilibrium is characterized by the conditions on equilibrium in the 
product market and in the wholesale and retail sectors. First, the tax on RTP customers implies a tax wedge 
between the wholesale prices received by the generators and the price paid by the customers, so pt = wt + τrip. 
Second, there is a tax wedge between the flat-rate price paid by the customers   and the flat rate received by the 
retail sector,   - τflat. Thus , the equilibrium flat rate is determined by   - τflat = [    
 wtDt(  )]/[    
 Dt(  )] Third, 
the capacity tax raises the cost of capital to r + σ . The long-run equilibrium condition on generator profits is 
then     
 wt  t(pt ,   ) – C(  t(pt ,   ), K) = (r + σ)K. The final condition equates supply and demand in every 
period: wt = Cq(  t(pt ,   ), K). 
 
Given this characterization of the equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that the second-best optimum will 
be attained in equilibrium by a policy with a tax/subsidy to the flat-rate customers of      
  =     
  - 
[    
   
 Dt(    
 )]/[    
 Dt(    
 )] and no taxes or subsidies to the real-time customers or to capacity, i.e., τrtp = 0 
and σ = O. The second term of      
   is the quantity-weighted average price of buying wholesale power for flat-
rate customers when the flat rate is     
 . Thus,      
  is the tax or subsidy that allows the retailer to break even 
while charging     
 .
25
 Therefore, we have the following. 
 
Theorem 2 (achieving second-best optimality with taxes/subsidies). With external financing, a policy with a 
tax/subsidy on the flat-rate customers of 
 
and no taxes or subsidies on the real-time customers or on capacity, i.e., τrip = 0 and σ = 0, achieves the second-
best optimal allocation and capacity investment. The optimal policy,      
 , may be a tax or a subsidy. Any policy 
that taxes or subsidizes real-time customers or capacity cannot attain the second-best optimum. 
 
Proof. If τflat =      
  and τrtp = σ = 0, the retailers break even when charging     
  and paying the retail tax. 
Therefore,     
  is the equilibrium flat rate, and equilibrium consumption of the flat-rate customers is at the 
second-best optimal level. The competitive equilibrium for a given   does not introduce any additional 
distortions in consumption of the real-time customers or in investment, since real-time prices and investment 
costs are not distorted and thus the second-best optimum is attained. 
 
Any policy with τrtp  0 or σ   0 cannot attain the second-best optimum. First, if     
  is not the equilibrium flat 
rate, then the consumption of the flat-rate customers is distorted. Alternately, if     
  is the equilibrium flat rate, 
then the second best is attained when τrtp = σ = 0, and any other policy would distort either consumption of real-
time customers or investment. Q.E.D. 
 
Most of the public policy debates regarding investment in electricity markets have not actually considered taxes 
or capacity subsidies from outside the industry. Instead, the recommended policy tool has usually been capacity 
subsidies financed by fees collected from retail electricity providers. In most cases, the collection mechanism 
suggested has been a time-invariant retail electricity tax that applies to all retail customers. It is a 
straightforward implication of Theorem 2, discussed in more depth in Borenstein and Holland (2003b), that 
such policies do not attain the second-best optimum consumption or investment. 
 
3. Changing the proportion of customers on real-time pricing 
While it is clear that, absent metering costs , charging real-time prices to all customers would be Pareto 
efficient, in reality any changes toward RTP are likely to be incremental, with an increasing share of customers 
moving to RTP over time. This section examines the effect of changing the proportion of customers on RTP. 
Following the assumptions of the previous sections , we first examine effects when all customers have the same 
demand patterns and α is set exogenously. Even in this relatively uncomplicated case, we reach some surprising 
conclusions. In the final subsection, we examine the outcomes when customers choose whether or not to switch 
to RTP in a market context, recognizing both the costs of metering and the fact that customers are 
heterogeneous. 
 
The effect on prices of increasing RTP customers. Increasing the proportion of customers on RTP increases 
the elasticity of demand by rotating   t around   . This has two effects on wholesale prices. For periods in which 
the wholesale price is above the flat rate, increasing a decreases quantity demanded, since more customers face 
the higher real-time price. This decrease in demand drives down the wholesale price in these periods. 
Conversely, for periods in which the wholesale price is below the flat rate, quantity demanded increases with α, 
since more customers face the lower real-time price. This drives up the wholesale prices in these periods. Thus, 
some wholesale prices increase and some decrease when more customers are put on real-time pricing. 
 
The effect on the flat retail rate in the long run, however, is not ambiguous. 
 
Theorem 3 (effect of increasing RTP customers on flat retail rate). In the long run, an increase in the 
proportion of customers on RTP reduces     
 . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The key to this result is recognizing that retailers break even on the flat-rate customers by covering losses when 
the retail margin is negative (peak periods) with gains when the margin is positive (off-peak periods). Since flat-
rate customers demand more in peak periods, the retailer cares more about price changes in the peak periods. 
Because increasing a will rotate the wholesale demand, increasing the proportion of customers on RTP 
decreases the peak wholesale prices and increases off-peak wholesale prices. This can be beneficial for the 
retailers if the peak prices decrease sufficiently relative to the increases in the off-peak prices. However, these 
price changes also affect wholesale profits and investment. In the Appendix we show that holding   constant, 
the decreased retail losses in the peak periods are greater than the decreased retail gains in off-peak periods if 
capacity adjusts such that wholesale profits are unchanged. Thus, if customers were moved to RTP and   did 
not decline, retailers would be earning positive profits on flat-rate customers. Competition in the retail market 
would then force down retail prices. 
 
The effect on capacity of increasing RTP customers. Under regulation, investment in the electricity industry 
was determined primarily by projections of annual peak loads. Additional generation was deemed necessary if 
reserve margins during peak hours were insufficient. Since putting additional customers on RTP would reduce 
peak loads, this could reduce the need for investment.
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In competitive markets, investment in generation capacity is driven by profit opportunities rather than by a 
planning process. Since putting more customers on RTP leads to decreased real-time prices in peak periods, this 
effect implies decreased wholesale profits in peak periods and reduced incentives for investment. However, in 
periods when the marginal cost is below the flat rate, increasing α would lead to increased demand. If the 
industry marginal cost has positive slope, this would increase prices and profits in these periods. New 
investment occurs if the additional wholesale profit off-peak is greater than the decline in profit during the peak 
periods. 
 
To see this in our model, recall that equilibrium wholesale profits in the short-run are given by    
  = Σt pt  (pt 
,  ) – C(  (pt ,   ), K). Since pt = Cq in equilibrium, it follows that 
 
Since (8) is a weighted average of the dpt/dα, which may be positive or negative, the short-run wholesale profits 
may increase or decrease. This implies that investment may increase or decrease. 
 
Theorem 4 (indeterminant effect of increasing RTP customers on capacity). An increase in the proportion of 
customers on RTP can increase or decrease long-run equilibrium capacity    
 . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The proof of Theorem 4 highlights the importance of the convexity of the marginal costs across the relevant 
range. If the marginal cost curve is relatively flat at off-peak demand levels, then putting additional customers 
on RTP will not increase the off-peak prices very much. If the marginal cost curve is relatively steep at peak 
demand levels, then increasing α will cause relatively large decreases in the peak prices. These relatively large 
price decreases on peak imply that wholesale profits decrease in the short run and equilibrium capacity 
decreases when α increases. In the simulations we have run with realistic parameters, presented in Section 4, 
increases in α cause capacity to decline in the long run in all cases. 
 
Conversely, if the marginal cost curve is relatively steep at off-peak demand levels and relatively flat at peak 
demand levels, e.g., if Cq were concave, then the off-peak price increase would be greater than the peak price 
decrease, and wholesale profits and capacity would increase. Since this is the surprising case, we present in the 
Appendix a simple example where putting more customers on RTP leads to increased investment. Note that in 
this example, the marginal cost curve is not concave. 
 
The effect on efficiency of increasing RTP customers. As shown above, if all customers are on RTP, 
allocation and investment are efficient. When some customers are not on RTP, electricity is allocated 
inefficiently between the flat-rate and RTP markets. The question remains about the welfare effects of a 
marginal increase in the proportion of customers on RTP when α < 1. This question is more subtle than it may 
appear at first glance: Since the competitive equilibrium is not efficient, we cannot rely on comparative statics 
results from a constrained optimization problem. 
 
To analyze the long-run welfare effects of increasing the proportion of customers on RTP, we analyze the 
surplus accruing to different groups: the generators, the retail service providers, the customers on RTP, the 
customers on flat-rate pricing, and the customers who switch from flat rates to RTP. First, the generators and 
retail service providers receive no surplus in the long run, so their surplus is unaffected by increasing α. Second, 
Theorem 3 shows that     
  decreases in α. Therefore, the customers on flat-rate pricing consume more at a lower 
price. Thus, the flat-rate customers are better off with an increase in α. 
 
Third, the customer who switches from the flat rate to RTP receives higher surplus. This can be shown by a 
revealed-preferences argument. Since     
 ptDt(  ) =     
   Dt(  ), the switcher could consume exactly the same 
electricity quantities that the flat-rate customers choose at the exact same total bill. Since the switcher chooses 
to consume different quantities, it must be better off.
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Finally, the surplus to the customers who are already on RTP decreases in α. To see this, first note that the 
envelope theorem implies that the change in consumer surplus to an RTP customer in period t is given by 
 . Thus, the change in surplus to RTP customers is 
 
 
where the second equality follows from (8), recognizing dπ
w
/dα = 0 in the long run (because π
w
 = 0 in the long 
run) and recalling that    (pt,   ) = αD(pt)+ (1 — α)D(  ). 
 
We can show that (9) is negative by differentiating the zero-profit retail condition: π
r
 = (1 — α)     
 (  – 
pt)D(  )= 0. Differentiation implies that 
 
Since the competitive-equilibrium   results from Bertrand competition over the flat rates, the derivative ∂πr/∂   
must be greater than or equal to zero. Since d  /dα < 0 by Theorem 3,     
 (dpt / dα)(1 – α)Dt(  ) must be less 
than zero. Combining this with (9) shows that the consumer surplus to the incumbent RTP customers is 
decreasing in α. 
 
A bit of intuition for this result comes from thinking about a single small customer who is the only customer on 
RTP. That RTP customer is better off than a customer on a flat rate because it can reoptimize against the 
volatile real-time prices (the revealed-preferences argument above). As more customers move to RTP, that real-
time price volatility is muted, reducing the benefits from responding to the volatility. On the other hand, as 
more customers move to RTP, the weighted average wholesale price is lower, benefiting all customers. Our 
result shows that the first effect outweighs the second for the existing RTP customers, making them worse off. 
 
We have shown the long-run impact of increasing α on the four affected groups: incumbent RTP customers, 
"switchers," remaining flat-rate customers, and sellers. Since each group, except the incumbent R'TP customers, 
is no worse off, the overall welfare impact depends on the ability of these groups to compensate the potential 
losses of the incumbent RTP customers. 
 
Define W from (1) as the welfare attained in competitive equilibrium. The change in welfare from increasing 
customers on RTP is then given by 
 
We have shown that in the competitive equilibrium, ∂W/∂K = 0, i.e., capacity is set efficiently given the 
equilibrium prices. Likewise, ∂W/∂pt = 0 for all t, since we have explained earlier that real-time prices are set 
efficiently given the equilibrium   . Thus (11) reduces to dW/dα = (∂W/∂  )(d  /dα) + (∂W/∂α). 
 
The last term, ∂W/∂α, is the direct welfare gain from customers switching from flat-rate to RTP and can be 
written as 
 
which is positive by the revealed-preferences argument made above. Theorem 3 shows that d  /dα < 0, and in 
Section 2 we showed that ∂W / ∂  can be positive or negative depending on whether   e is greater or less than 
  *.28 Thus if decreasing   improves welfare, then increasing α improves efficiency. However, if decreasing   
decreases efficiency, then the welfare effects depend on whether or not the gains to the switchers are greater 
than the losses from decreasing   . To summarize, we have the following. 
 
Theorem 5 (welfare effects of increasing RTP customers). In the long run, an increase in the proportion of 
customers on RTP (i) increases consumer surplus of customers remaining on flat-rate service, (ii) increases 
consumer surplus of customers switching from flat rate to RTP, (iii) decreases consumer surplus of incumbent 
RTP customers, and (iv) has no effect on generator or retailer profits. Total welfare increases with an increase in 
the proportion of customers on RTP if   e >   *, but welfare may increase or decrease if   e <   *, the case in 
which lowering the equilibrium flat rate reduces efficiency. Welfare always increases (and is maximized) by 
putting all customers on RTP. 
 
Proof. Parts (i)—(iv) are proved in the text. Since dW/dα = (∂W / ∂  )(d  /dα)+(∂W / ∂α) and ∂W/∂α > 0, if   e > 
  *, so that ∂W / ∂   < 0, then (∂W / ∂  )(d  / dα) > 0 and increasing α increases total welfare. If   e <   *, then 
(∂W / ∂  )(d  /dα) < 0. Since ∂W∂α > 0, the net impact on welfare in this case is ambiguous. In the Appendix we 
demonstrate how an example in which increasing α lowers welfare can be constructed. Q.E.D. 
We know, however, from Section 2 that increasing α to one from any lower value increases welfare. Moreover, 
we know that the welfare attained in competitive equilibrium is continuous in α even at α =1. So, the example 
in the Appendix demonstrates that the increase in welfare need not always be monotonic as it moves to the 
maximum welfare at α = 1.
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RTP adoption in competitive markets. Thus far, we have assumed that α is set exogenously, ignoring the 
incentives customers would have to adopt RTP if such programs were voluntary. In a voluntary system, each 
customer would balance the potential gains from RTP against the metering costs. We now consider the 
incentives of customers to adopt RTP under competition. 
 
We assume that customers adopting RTP must pay, directly or indirectly, for the additional metering and billing 
costs and that these costs are independent of quantity consumed.
30
 Let M be the additional daily cost (variable 
plus amortized fixed cost) of metering and billing one customer when that customer adopts RTP. 
 
Assume, for now, that each customer constitutes a share γ of the total demand, where γ is very small. Since 
customers can avoid this additional metering cost by choosing the flat-rate service, customers will adopt RTP 
until in equilibrium we have 
 
Equation (13) determines the equilibrium share of customers on RTP, α. The benefit to adopting RTP is positive 
by the revealed-preferences argument and bounded. If M is large enough, then no customers will adopt RTP. 
Conversely, if M is small but still positive, then all customers adopt RTP. Even the last customer left on a flat-
rate tariff when all others have switched will have strictly positive benefits from switching that will outweigh a 
sufficiently small M. Since the left-hand side of (13) is decreasing in α - an implication of Theorem 5 —if M is 
positive but not too large, there will be a solution with 0 < α ≤ 1.
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 The long-run competitive equilibrium with 
customer choice over rate structure is then fully described by (13) plus the conditions described in the 
characterization of the long-run equilibrium above. 
 
First note that, as in Section 2, the competitive equilibrium with competitive RTP selection does not attain the 
second-best optimum, since the equilibrium flat rate will be suboptimal. To analyze the efficiency of 
competitive RTP adoption, we define W as the welfare attained in the competitive equilibrium where now W 
incorporates the metering cost (α/γ)M , i.e., the costs of metering the RTP customers. From a long-run 
competitive equilibrium, differentiating W as in (11) yields the following result. 
 
Theorem 6 (nonoptimality of competitive RTP selection). If metering costs are positive and customers choose 
between flat rates or real-time prices, the long-run competitive equilibrium does not in general attain the 
second-best optimal electricity allocation, capacity investment, and RTP metering. Competition leads to 
excessive adoption of RTP if   e <   *. If   e >   * , RTP is adopted less than is optimal. 
 
Proof. Nonoptimality of the electricity allocation and capacity investment follow directly from Theorem lb. 
Next, consider dW / dα evaluated at the competitive equilibrium. The partial derivative of W with respect to α is 
now 
 
The first equality follows from differentiation of W as in (12), the second equality is algebra, and the third 
equality follows from (13) and the condition on retail profit. Since ∂W/∂α = 0, it follows from (11) that dW/dα = 
(∂W / ∂  / dα). Since d  / dα < 0 from Theorem 3, increasing metering beyond the competitive level increases 
welfare if and only if ∂W / ∂   < 0. Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 6 obtains because customers do not recognize that by adopting RT'P they drive down the flat rate for 
the remaining customers. If the flat rate is higher than optimal, this externality is beneficial, and too few 
customers adopt RTP. On the other hand, if the flat rate is too low, then the extemality is harmful, and too many 
customers adopt RTP.
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If customers differ in size but have identical demands up to a scale parameter, we can represent each customer i 
as constituting yi of total demand. Since metering costs are independent of the scale parameter, (13) implies that 
the customers with the largest yi would be the first to adopt RTP. However, the marginal customer still would 
not consider the effect on   of its decision to adopt, and adoption could be excessive or insufficient. 
 
We leave for future research an in-depth analysis of outcomes when customers have different demand profiles, 
but it seems clear that the incentive to adopt is further complicated in two ways. First, an elasticity effect will 
cause customers with more elastic demand to be more inclined to adopt RTP. For instance, if two customers on 
flat-rate service demand the same quantities in each period, but one has much more elastic demand in all 
periods , then that customer has a much stronger incentive to adopt RTP. This welfare effect, however, seems to 
be fully captured by the adopter. Second, the adverse-selection effect will cause customers who have relatively 
lower demands at peak times and relatively higher demands at off-peak times to be more inclined to adopt. For 
these customers, even if they made no change to their purchasing, they would pay less on RTP. The adverse-
selection effect, however, is just a transfer from customers with "peakier" demands who are subsidized under 
flat-rate pricing. This transfer, which does not by itself change total surplus, gives some customers inefficiently 
large incentives to pay M in order to adopt RTP.
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 The adverse-selection effect will tend to cause   to rise as 
these customers adopt RTP, which may or may not outweigh the tendency for   to fall with adoption when 
customers are identical. If   were to rise, this most likely could raise or lower welfare, depending on whether   e 
is greater or less than   *. 
 
Finally, we again address the extension of the model to incorporate nonzero cross-price elasticities. With 
nonzero cross-partial derivatives, the proof of Theorem 3 holds under the additional assumption on the cross-
partials:     
 (∂ Dt / ∂pj )[(dpj / dα ) /(dpt / dα)] < 0 for every t . This condition clearly holds if all cross-partials 
are zero, as we've assumed above, since demand is downward sloping. Note that it also holds, for example, if 
electricity consumption in each peak period is complementary to consumption in all other peak periods but a 
substitute for consumption in off-peak periods and vice versa. 
 
Under nonzero cross-price elasticities, Theorem 4 is still valid since it describes the ambiguity of the effect on 
capacity. Parts (i) and (iii) of Theorem 5 relied on Theorem 3 and thus obtain under the above condition on the 
cross-partials. Part (ii) remains valid by the revealed-preferences argument, and part (iv) and the remainder of 
the theorem remain valid by the arguments presented above. Theorem 6 also remains valid. Thus the main 
theoretical results of this section obtain if the model allows nonzero price elasticities. 
 
'Throughout the analysis, we have ignored the potential for price volatility to lower the welfare of RTP 
customers due to risk aversion. In reality, these risks can be nearly entirely eliminated through forward 
contracting for fixed quantities of power for each hour of the year. Such fixed-quantity contracts, similar to 
standard futures contracts that are used for hedging risk, can eliminate most of the wealth risk caused by 
fluctuating electricity prices while still giving the customer the full incentive effect of time-varying prices on 
the margin. They would have no effect on our analysis.
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 Such contracts are quite different from the 
"requirements contracts" that nearly all retail customers currently face, in which the customer has a right to buy 
any quantity it chooses at a price specified months in advance through a regulatory process or long-term 
contract. Customers under requirements contracts correspond to flat-rate customers in our analysis. 
 
4. How much difference would RTP make? 
While the analysis thus far demonstrates that RTP is likely to improve welfare, such a change would also 
involve costs, so it is important to evaluate the magnitude of the effect that RTP would have. Full estimation of 
the expected effect is beyond the scope of this article, but in this section we offer some preliminary analysis that 
suggests that the welfare gain is likely to be significant and to vastly outweigh the costs of implementing RTP 
for at least the largest customers. 
 
To accomplish this, we simulate long-run competitive equilibria under a set of realistic assumptions about the 
system demand profile and the production technologies available. We simulate the system first using a flat-rate 
retail pricing scheme and then putting some share of the customers on RTP. No such simulation can include all 
factors that would affect the welfare change due to RTP, but we believe that we capture the primary effects. We 
conclude this section with a discussion of omitted factors and how they would be likely to alter the analysis. 
 
Since we have assumed competitive generation markets and no cross-subsidy between RTP and flat-rate 
customers, the simulations could also be interpreted as applying to multiple retail providers that participate in 
the same wholesale market. For instance, the customers of one utility, constituting perhaps two-thirds of the 
total wholesale market, might remain on flat rates, while the customers of a competing retail provider that 
participates in the same wholesale market and comprises the remainder of demand might be on RTP.
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 The 
analysis thus far shows that the RTP customers would produce positive spillovers for the utility customers. The 
simulations suggest how large that effect might be. 
 
Assumptions. We depart somewhat from the simple theoretical model in the previous sections by assuming that 
there are multiple technologies of production that range from high-capital/low-variable cost to low-capital/high-
variable cost. Each technology has a simple cost function: a unit of capacity has an annual capital cost 
(independent of usage) and a constant per-megawatt-hour marginal cost up to the unit's capacity of one 
megawatt.
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 There are no economies of scale in any of the technologies, or equivalently, over the relevant range 
of usage, each technology can be scaled up or down at constant long-run average cost. 
 
To be concrete, we assume that there are three technologies: a baseload technology (highest capital, lowest 
marginal cost) for which we set the parameters to roughly reflect coal-fired generation, a mid-merit technology, 
which is set to reflect combined-cycle gas turbine generation, and a peaker technology, which is meant to reflect 
combustion turbine generation. The cost assumptions are shown in Table 1. We assume that in the long run 
there is free entry and exit of any of these technologies. We also assume that no company owns a sufficient 
amount of production to be able to exercise market power. The retail price charged to customers reflects 
production costs plus $40/MWh to cover transmission and distribution, a figure that we assume is not subject to 
temporal variation. 
 
On the demand side, we start from a basic distribution of demand levels that we have taken from the actual 
reported demand levels in the California Independent System Operator's control area over the two-year period 
November 1998 through October 2000.
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 This period includes periods of record high consumption and very low 
consumption, a mild summer in 1999 and an unusually hot summer in 2000. To get from these demand 
quantities to a set of demand curves, we assume that each quantity occurred at the same flat-rate retail price.
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Further, we assume that the flat retail rate that resulted in these demand quantities is the one that we calculate 
below to be the break-even rate.
39
 We assume that retail customer demand goes through the actual quantity at 
the equilibrium flat retail rate, and that it takes a constant-elasticity form with the assumed elasticity, which we 
discuss next.
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For the switch to RTP to have any effect, demand must be price elastic. Estimates of price elasticity of 
electricity demand vary widely, but the very short-run price elasticity is commonly argued to be in the range of 
— .1 . In the longer run, we would expect greater elasticities, as customers adapt to price variability and 
response technologies—e.g., thermostats that change settings in response to price—improve and come down in 
cost. Therefore, we also evaluate the effect for assumed demand elasticities of — .3 and — .5.
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 We assume that 
all customers have the same demand elasticity and the same "load profile," i.e., all customers are identical up to 
a scale factor. 
 
These cost and demand specifications, along with assumptions of price-taking behavior by all market 
participants and free entry/exit of producers, are sufficient to determine a unique long-run competitive 
equilibrium for any α > 0.
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 The algorithm for determining the competitive equilibrium and its uniqueness are 
discussed in greater detail in Borenstein (2005b). 
 
To determine the base case in which all customers are on flat-rate service requires a somewhat different 
approach. Any given flat rate,   , determines the quantity demanded in each hour. Given the quantity to be 
produced in each hour, straightforward algebra determines the cost minimizing amount of each type of capacity 
that should be installed and the number of hours each would be used. This determines the total cost of 
production. The   is then adjusted iteratively until the total revenue generated with that flat rate is equal to the 
total (minimized) cost of production, which is the competitive-equilibrium flat rate. 
 
Results. The results of these simulations are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 indicates the capacity, price, 
and quantity outcomes, while Table 3 shows the changes in consumer surplus, which approximately equal total 
surplus because all sellers earn zero profit in equilibrium (up to the integer constraint on capacity). In Table 2, 
the results with all customers on flat-rate service are shown at the top. The rows below show the outcomes 
under varying assumptions about the demand elasticity and shares of customers on RTP. 
 
Table 2 is consistent with our theoretical finding that as more customers switch to RTP, the equilibrium flat rate 
falls. It also indicates that RTP would have large effects on the equilibrium installed capacity. Even with an 
elasticity of only — .1, putting just a third of customers on RTP would cut the number of peakers by about 44% 
and the total installed capacity by more than 10%. Though we showed that theoretically RTP would not 
necessarily lower the total installed capacity, that is the effect we find in all simulations using realistic 
parameters. With enough elasticity, or most customers on RTP, baseload (high capital-cost, low variable-cost) 
capacity becomes relatively more cost effective, eventually eliminating peakers entirely as the quantity 
volatility is greatly reduced due to retail price volatility. 
 
Retail price volatility would be a significant feature of the RTP market, though much less so if there were more 
elasticity or a large share of customers on RTP. With an elasticity of — .1 and only a third of customers on 
RTP, the peak price would be more than 100 times the average price. In only 113 hours of the year, about 1.3% 
of the time, would all of the capacity be used; in all other hours price would be no higher than the marginal 
production cost of the peaker units (plus transmission and distribution (T&D)). With greater elasticity, the 
capacity is used more intensively, with a great number of hours in which all capacity is used. An elasticity of — 
.3 yields a peak price that is 79% lower than results with an elasticity of — .1, with a third of customers on 
RTP. Our theoretical model does not predict the direction of change in either total consumption or the total 
energy bill, but these simulations indicate that total energy consumption could increase, while total energy bills 
could fall. 
 
Table 3 presents the welfare effects of introducing RTP. All of the "change" columns are in comparison to the 
equilibrium with all customers on flat rate. The "Total Surplus Change" column indicates that the gains would 
be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year for the California system, which would be between 3% and 
11% of the total energy bill that obtained under flat rates. 
 
In comparison to the cost of implementing RTP, these gains are likely to be large for at least some customers. In 
2001, in the midst of the California electricity crisis, the state legislature passed a bill mandating real-time 
meters for all large customers, those with peak demand above 200 kilowatts. The cost of installing and 
operating meters for these 20,000 customers, which constituted about one-third of California demand, was 
about $35 million. Though other administrative costs would also accompany RTP, these other costs are unlikely 
to be larger than the original meter installation costs. Thus, it appears that the gains would almost certainly 
outweigh the costs.
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Implementing RTP for the remaining customers might not be such a clear net gain. Table 3 indicates that the 
marginal surplus gains to RTP are declining in the share of customers on RTP. At all the elasticities in Table 3, 
putting the first one-third of the customers on RTP produces more than half the gains that result from putting all 
on RTP. Furthermore, the cost of switching the remaining customers would be greater due to the small size of 
individual customers: switching the first one-third of customers in California required replacing about 20,000 
meters, while switching the remaining two-thirds would require replacing over 10 million meters.
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The aggregate measures of surplus are affected by the change in the share of customers on RTP and so may 
obscure the effect on individual customers. Comparing the rows in Table 3 with different shares of customers 
on RTP combines the effect on "switchers" with the effect on incumbent RTP and flat-rate customers who do 
not switch. To illustrate the effect on individual customers who do not switch, Table 3 also presents consumer 
surplus changes for a hypothetical customer that constitutes .001% of the total demand curve in any hour and 
remains on either RTP or a flat-rate tariff in all simulations.45 The columns showing the surplus of these 
hypothetical customers on flat rate and RTP are consistent with the theoretical finding that switching customers 
to RTP benefits remaining flat-rate customers (which follows immediately from the decline in the flat rate 
shown in Table 2) and harms incumbent RTP customers. 
 
The two right-hand columns of Table 3 decompose the surplus change that results from increasing the share of 
customers on RTP into the change captured by the switchers and the external effect on nonswitchers (both 
remaining flat-rate customers and incumbent RTP customers). The changes in each row are the result of 
increasing the share on RTP from the level in the previous row (from zero in the case of a .333 share on RTP). 
As expected, putting the first third of demand on RTP not only benefits the switchers, it also benefits the 
nonswitchers in aggregate, because all nonswitchers are flat-rate customers who benefit from the decline in the 
flat rate. Moving the next third of customers to RTP, however, creates both positive (on flat-rate customers) and 
negative (on incumbent RTP customers) externalities. The net effect, found by properly weighting these 
positive and negative changes in consumer surplus, is a small negative externality. Putting nearly all of the 
remaining customers on RTP creates a larger net negative externality, because it harms incumbent RTP 
customers, while there are almost no flat-rate customers left to benefit from the declining flat rate. 
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that while demand elasticity is necessary for RTP to create social benefits, it 
may not take very much elasticity. There seems to be a declining marginal gain from increased elasticity. In the 
simulations, the gain from putting a given share of customers on RTP when the elasticity is — .1 is about 45% 
of the gain when the elasticity is — .5, five times greater. 
 
Omitted factors. As we stated at the beginning of this section, these simulations omit a number of factors that 
one would want to address in a complete simulation of RTP. In this subsection, we discuss some of these factors 
and their likely impact. 
 
Reserves. Demand and supply must balance exactly at all times in an electricity grid, so grid operators keep 
capacity on standby to respond as demand fluctuates stochastically. Holding such supply reserves is costly. The 
need for reserves would almost certainly be reduced with greater use of RTP, because price variation would 
substitute to some extent for quantity fluctuations. Thus, RTP would also reduce reserve costs. The potential for 
savings is bounded above by the size of reserve costs, which are 7-10% of total operating costs in a typical 
system. A significant proportion of this cost would remain if few customers would be willing to let the grid 
operator control their second-to-second consumption in order to balance the system. 
 
Stochastic supply outages. The simulations assume that all generators are perfectly reliable. In fact, generators 
go out of service stochastically. If all units were very small and outages were uncorrelated, then the law of large 
numbers would imply that this requires simply a resealing of effective capacity per unit. In fact, some 
generation units are large, and outages are not completely uncorrelated, so the grid operator must hold reserves 
also to respond to these outages. As above, however, RTP would reduce the need to hold reserves to respond to 
unforeseen supply/demand imbalances. 
 
Nonconvexities in production. As discussed in detail by Mansur (forthcoming), generation units do not 
costlessly or instantly switch from off to full production. There are startup costs and "ramping" constraints (on 
the speed with which output can be adjusted). These constraints make it more costly to adjust supply to meet 
demand fluctuations. As with reserves, RTP would allow some of this adjustment to occur on the demand side 
in a way that would enhance efficiency. 
 
Pricing of transmission and distribution. The simulations take a constant $40/MWh charge for transmission 
and distribution. This is based on the historical recovery of the costs of these services, which are provided by a 
regulated monopoly. To the extent that minimum efficient capacity scale for T&D implies that they are never 
capacity constrained, introducing time-varying prices of these services would not improve efficiency. That may 
be the case with most local distribution, but transmission lines frequently face capacity constraints. By ignoring 
these constraints and holding the T&D cost per MWh constant, the simulations understate the potential gains for 
RTP that could also reflect time-varying (opportunity) cost of transmission. 
 
Market power. In the simulations, we assume that sellers never exercise market power. As has been discussed 
elsewhere (see Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999, and Bushnell, 2005), demand elasticity introduced by 
implementing RTP reduces the incentive of sellers to exercise market power. However, it is unclear how much 
incremental inefficiency the exercise of market power itself introduces in a flat-rate system. In fact, for   e <   *, 
seller market power could increase efficiency by increasing the flat retail rate, providing that any production 
inefficiencies (due to misallocation of production across plants) were small. In a full RTP system, market power 
could not reduce deadweight loss. Thus, it is difficult to analyze the bias from excluding seller market power. 
 
Nonzero cross-elasticities of demand across hours . In the demand structure that we have analyzed, own-price 
elasticities are nonzero and all cross-elasticities are zero. Simulation with a complete matrix of own- and cross-
elasticities would increase the complexity substantially. Still, if demands are generally substitutes across hour, it 
seems very likely that incorporation of cross-elasticities would increase the gains from RTP. Essentially, RTP 
increases efficiency by reducing the volatility of quantity consumed and increasing the utilization rate of 
installed capacity. Holding constant own-price elasticities, increasing cross-price elasticities from zero to 
positive (substitutes) will tend to further reduce quantity volatility by increasing off-peak quantity when peak 
prices rise and reducing peak quantity when off-peak prices fall. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Electricity deregulation has proceeded with support from many economists on the belief that competitive 
electricity markets will produce more efficient outcomes than regulation. That still may turn out to be true, 
though in many locations, most notably California, there is significant evidence that the markets have not been 
sufficiently competitive. Even if market changes succeed in making the markets competitive, however, we have 
shown that flat-rate pricing of a significant share of retail customers will remain a barrier to achieving efficient 
outcomes. Not only does flat-rate retail pricing have the obvious problem of preventing hour-by-hour prices that 
reflect wholesale costs, flat-rate pricing in a competitive market fails to achieve even the second-best optimum 
of the welfare-maximizing flat-rate price. As a result, we have shown that capacity investment will in general 
differ from the second-best optimal level. In order to assure adequate capacity investment, many market 
participants and advisors have argued for "capacity payments," which are effectively subsidies that reduce the 
cost of owning capacity arid, thus, increase equilibrium investment. We have demonstrated that capacity 
subsidies (or taxes) cannot achieve the second-best optimum, because they create other distortions as they 
address the distortion caused by flat-rate customers. 
 
Many economists and some industry participants have argued strongly for increasing the proportion of 
customers on RTP. We have shown that while increasing the proportion of customers on RTP is likely to 
increase market efficiency, exceptions are possible at least for some locally extreme shapes of demand 
functions. We have also demonstrated that increases in the share of customers on RTP can harm customers who 
are already on RTP, while benefitting those who remain on flat rates. The net effect of such a change on the 
level of equilibrium capacity, we demonstrate, is ambiguous.
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To analyze these effects and assess their relevance for policy analysis, we developed a simulation model using 
three types of generation technology and realistic load profiles information. The simulation indicated that 
increasing the share of customers on RTP would decrease capacity and monotonically increase welfare. The 
effects on peaking capacity were particularly notable; we estimate that putting a third of customers on RTP 
would reduce peaking capacity requirements by 44%. The welfare gains were also substantial, with gains from 
3% to 11% of the total energy bill. We found that the incremental gains from putting additional customers on 
RTP declined with the share that were already on RTP. 
 
We've modelled the flat-rate retail price problem in the context and institutions of deregulated electricity 
markets , but the application is much broader.
47
 In many markets , retail prices cannot, or at least do not, 
fluctuate to reflect changes in market and cost conditions. This is broadly recognized, but there seems to be a 
view that competitive determination of some sort of smoothed or average retail price allows the welfare analysis 
of competitive markets to go through at least approximately. Our results suggest that this isn't the case, that 
competitive determination of retail prices that are constrained not to adjust as frequently as costs will not 
achieve a second-best optimum. 
 
In the general context of sticky prices, we have presented a view of how markets may operate that is different 
from those presented by Carlton (1986) and others who examine nonprice rationing. In those models , all prices 
are sticky and therefore nonprice rationing is used to distribute the product. In our approach, prices are sticky to 
some customers and the remaining customers face a residual supply for which price is very volatile. Which 
model is more appropriate will depend on the specific institutions of a market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4, along with examples demonstrating that increasing the share of customers on RTP 
can reduce equilibrium capacity and reduce equilibrium welfare, follow. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3. We demonstrate this theorem by evaluating the long-run change in retail profits, π
r
, caused 
by a change in α, holding   constant. We show that retailer profits would increase, i.e., become positive, if   did 
not change. Since any higher flat rate would also have positive profit, the new equilibrium flat rate must be 
lower, i.e., competition in the retail sector reduces   . 
 
We wish to evaluate dπ
r
 Ida holding   constant. Since   is constant, dπr/dα = (1 — α) Σt —Dt(  )(dwt /dα) is a 
weighted average of dwt /dα. 
 
First note that competitive investment implies that in the long run, 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider a long-run competitive equilibrium with two time periods: peak, H, and off-peak, 
L. Note that the short-run equilibrium does not depend on the shape of the marginal cost curve Cq but only on 
the equilibrium marginal costs. Similarly, the long-run equilibrium would not change if we perturbed Cq without 
changing the equilibrium marginal costs or the sum of the total costs. Thus, if we increased the convexity of Cq 
such that Cq(  L(pL ,   ), K), Cq(  H(pH,   ), K), and C(  L (pL ,   ), K)+C(  H(pH,   ), K) did not change, then the 
long-run equilibrium would not change. 
 
Note that dpt /dα = Cqq(d  t /dα) in the short run, which implies that dpL /dα > 0 and dpH /dα < 0. Starting from 
a long-run equilibrium, we can increase the convexity of Cq without changing the long-run equilibriurn if 
Cqq(  L(pL ,   ), K) > 0. By increasing the convexity of Cq without changing the long-run equilibrium, we can 
make Cqq(  L(pL ,   ), K) smaller and Cqq(  H(pH,   ), K) larger. But this implies that dpL /dα is less positive and 
that dpH /dα is more negative. Thus (8) can be negative. Similarly, an example can be constructed where (8) is 
positive by increasing the concavity of Cq. An example of a capacity increase follows. Q.E.D. 
 
Example of an increase in RTP customers that increases capacity. To show that increasing the proportion of 
customers on RTP can lead to increased investment, consider a parallel linear-demand model with linear 
marginal costs. Let Dt(p)= At — Bp and Cq = q/K . Since supply equals demand in every period,                         
pt = [At — B(1 - α)  ](K + Bα), which implies that 
 
where Yt   (K + B)   — At. This implies that retail profits can be written π
r
 = f (α)ΣYtDt(  ), where f (α) = 
(1 — α)/(K + Bα). Since f (α)  0, in short-run equilibrium, ΣYtDt(  ) must equal zero. But since ΣYtDt(  ) does 
not depend on α, it is also zero when α increases, i.e., putting more customers on RTP does not change the 
short-run equilibrium flat rate. 
 
Now consider how the short-run wholesale profits change with changes in α. Differentiating (A4) and noting 
that the short-run flat rate and Yt do not depend on α implies that dpt /dα = BYt /(K + Bα)
2
. By the envelope 
theorem, the change in wholesale profits is Σ(dpt/dα)  t, which implies that wholesale profits increase or 
decrease depending on whether Σ Yt  t is positive or negative. From (A4), Yt is positive if and only if   > pt, 
which occurs if and only if   t(pt ,   ) > Dt(  ). Therefore Σ Yt  t > Σ YtDt(  ), since the first weighted average of 
the Yt puts more weight on each positive Yt and less weight on each negative Yt. Since Σ YtDt(  ) = 0, the first 
weighted average is positive and the short-run wholesale profits increase with α. 
 
Example of an increase RTP customers that decreases welfare. We have shown that dW/dα = (∂W/∂  )(d  / 
dα)+ (∂W/∂α). We construct an example in which dW/dα can be negative by showing that the second term, 
which is positive, can be made arbitrarily small while holding the first term, which can be negative, constant. 
 
First, recall that the competitive equilibrium is characterized completely by pt,   , α,r, K, the unit supply function 
S, and the demand functions Dt. Note, however, that the equilibrium does not depend on the entire demand 
functions, but rather only on two points, Dt(pt) and Dt(  ), of each demand function. Thus, any system of 
demand equations that does not change these 2T points (nor α, S, or r) will have an equilibrium with the same 
prices and capacity. 
 
Next, consider d  /dα, dpt/dα, and dK/dα. By the Implicit Function Theorem, these derivatives can be found by 
totally differentiating the system of equations that characterize the competitive equilibrium. This implies that 
d  /dα can be written as a function of the 7T + 4 parameters: pt, Dt(pt),   
 (pt), Dt(  ),   
 (  ),   , α, S(pt), S' (pt), r, 
and K . Since ∂W/∂  can also be written in terms of these 7T + 4 parameters, the product (∂W/∂  )(d  /dα) would 
not change if we were to perturb the demand curves such that the demands and slopes at pt and   were 
unchanged. 
 
Now consider ∂W/∂α. [121 can be written 
 
Note that the summands in (A7) are always positive. For example, if pt >   , the difference Ut(D(pt)) — Ut(D(  )) 
is negative but it is smaller in absolute value than —pt[Dt(pt) — Dt((  ) > 0. Conversely, if pt <   , the difference 
Ut(D(pt)) — Ut(D(  )) is positive and larger (in absolute value) than — pt[Dt(pt)— Dt(  )] < 0. Note, however, 
that these summands depend on the shape of the demand curve between Dt(pt) and Dt(  ). This implies that the 
summands can be made arbitrarily small by making the demands more concave (convex) for pt above (below)   
while holding constant the Dt(pt),   
 (pt), Dt(  ),   
 (  ). For example, in the case of pt >   , the welfare gain from 
switchers would be arbitrarily small —without changing slopes or demands at pt and   — if demand were a 
concave right angle between pt and   , i.e., if demand were identical to Dt(p) for p > pt —   and for p <   +   but 
were constant at Dt(  +  ) for p   [  + , pt —  ]. Although this demand curve would be discontinuous at D(pt 
—  ), continuous examples could be similarly constructed. 
Finally, consider any equilibrium where ∂W /∂  > 0. By perturbing the demand curves between Dt(pt) and Dt(  ) 
without changing Dt(pt),   
 (pt), Dt(  ), or   
 (  ), the term ∂W/∂α can be made arbitrarily small without changing 
(∂W/   )(d  /dα). 
 
This example is obviously an extreme case, since it relies on making the gains to switchers arbitrarily small by 
making peak demand curves concave and off-peak demand curves convex. Our simulations and empirical work 
have failed to generate this situation, but further work is required to understand the policy relevance of this 
example. 
 
Notes: 
1 For items with highly volatile ingredient costs, however, some restaurants list only "market price" on the 
menu, indicating that the benefits of time-invariant pricing are outweighed in those cases by the ability to 
quickly change price. We return to this endogeneity of variable pricing later in the article. 
2 See Steiner (1957), Boiteux (1960), Wenders (1976), Panzar (1976), Williamson (1966, 1974), and Bergstrom 
and MacKie-Mason (1991). For a survey of the literature on peak-load pricing see Crew, Fernando, and 
Kleindorfer (1995). 
3 Numerous studies have analyzed market power and market design issues in restructured electricity markets, 
such as Joskow and Kahn (2002) and Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002). We analyze the efficiency of 
competitive markets in the absence of these other potential distortions. 
4 We analyze inefficiencies resulting from prices being fixed over time. Pricing distortions also occur because 
wholesale prices vary by location, due to transmission constraints, but retail prices frequently do not reflect that 
variation. Analysis of prices that are fixed across locations is beyond the scope of this article. 
5 Concerns about investment adequacy also stem from regulatory inefficiencies such as price caps, regulatory 
credibility, and restrictions in siting power plants. These regulatory inefficiencies would not be relevant in 
deregulated, competitive markets. 
6 An important attribute of electricity that is not present in most other industries is the potentially extremely 
high costs of using nonprice methods to accommodate a shortage of the product. 
7 Following the literature on peak-load pricing, we assume that cross-price elasticities between demands in 
different periods are zero but discuss extending the analysis to nonzero cross-elasticities. Bergstrom and 
MacKie-Mason (1991) allow nonzero cross-elasticities but assume homothetic preferences across hours. 
8 Although some of the results, including Theorems la and lb, hold for α = 0, we assume α > 0 for expositional 
ease. We do not consider peak-load pricing with stochastic demand (see Carlton, 1977; Panzar and Sibley, 
1978; and Chao, 1983), but we note here that with α = 0, demand may not be met at all times. 
9 Throughout, we assume that customers on RTP are risk neutral with respect to the price of electricity. We 
discuss hedging of price risk later. 
10 We show similar results for reverse-L-shaped marginal cost curves (constant marginal cost up to a capacity 
constraint) in Borenstein and Holland (2003a). We assume continuity and nonzero derivatives here for ease of 
exposition. 
11 The assumption of identical technologies implies that the industry supply curve, found by inverting wt = 
Cq(q, K), is proportional to the supply from a single unit, i.e., industry supply can be written KS(w), where S(w) 
is the unit supply curve. 
12 Extending the analysis to include retailer costs of billing or distribution does not alter the analysis in any 
significant way. 
13 We assume that the system operator can bill each retailer for its customers' real-time consumption. If the 
customer doesn't have a real-time meter, the operator must use an assumed pattern of demand, known as a load 
profile. Joskow and Tirole (2004) show that the equilibrium is not substantially affected by load profiling. 
14 We have assumed here that retailers charge linear tariffs. Joskow and Tirole (2004) analyze a similar model 
and show that the equilibrium two-part tariff under load profiling, i.e., without real-time meters, has no fixed 
charge. 
15 Existence of the equilibrium can be shown since (i) retail profits are continuous in   (ii) retail profits are 
negative for   = 0, and (iii) retail profits are positive if   is equal to the highest wholesale price that occurs 
during the time period. 
16 This condition can alternately be written   t(pt,   ) = KS(wt). 
17 In Borenstein and Holland (2003b) we show that the equilibrium flat rate is always feasible in the short and 
long 
run. 
18 These conditions include market completeness and the absence of externalities, market power, and 
asymmetric information. 
19 This condition can be derived by solving the social planner's problem for the long run. 
20 This optimization is the sum of consumer surplus, Σ   t(pt,   ) - αpt Dt(pt) — (1 - α)   Dt(  ), retail profits,                            
Σ αpt Dt(pt) + (1 — α)   Dt(  ) — wt  t(pt,   ), and generator profits, Σ[wt   t(pt ,   ) — C(  t (pt ,   ),K)] — r K . 
Note that wt is simply a transfer and does not affect deadweight loss. 
21 For example, if the demands all have the same slope,     
  is simply the arithmetic mean of the wholesale 
prices. 
22 Clearly, the characterization of   * in (5) would be less intuitive and much more complex with nonzero cross-
elasticities. 
23 In some markets, capacity payments are contingent on a minimum level of capacity availability. 
24 Note that the description of these policy instruments is quite general and that each can be either positive, 
negative, or zero. 
25 The optimal flat-rate tax/subsidy is not, in general, equal to the difference between the second-best optimal 
flat rate and the equilibrium flat rate,     
  —     
 . The tax/subsidy, τ*, is like a Pigouvian tax/subsidy on an 
externality, but it does not attain the first best. 
26 Bergstrom and MacKie-Mason (1991) argue against the conventional wisdom by showing that peak-load 
pricing could increase investment under regulation. We analyze competitive markets and do not assume 
homothetic preferences. In a related model of airline competition, Dana (1999) shows that stochastic peak-load 
pricing can lead to lower capacity costs. 
27 Samuelson (1972) uses a similar revealed-preferences argument to argue that consumers always benefit from 
price stabilization that leaves producers equally well off. 
28 This assumes that the profit function is single peaked. 
29 Simulations with linear demands (in which 
  
   
  0) and simulations presented in Borenstein (2005b) that 
use actual California system load profiles and assume constant elasticity demand with higher elasticities during 
peak periods showed no cases in which welfare declined with an increase in α. 
30 Though costs do vary slightly with the size of customer demand, this is a reasonable approximation. See 
Jaske (2002). 
31 In what follows, we ignore the corner solutions. 
32 Brennan (2002) and Doucet and Kleit (2003) do not recognize this externality in their analyses of 
competitive adoption of real-time pricing. 
33 Borenstein (1989) develops a similar argument for why competitive insurance markets will use some costly 
risk-screening tests whose net effect is to lower total welfare. 
34 Borenstein (2005a) explains in more detail how forward contracts can be used to mitigate these risks. 
35 Such a system would not require real-time meters for the flat-rate customers, since the demand of the flat-
rate customers in aggregate could be calculated by the grid operator as system demand minus the real-time 
demand of RTP customers. 
36 Borenstein and Holland (2003a) prove the equivalent of Theorems 1 through 5 for production with such 
inverted L-shaped cost curves. 
37 The CAISO (www.caiso.com) is the quasi-governmental organization that controls the electricity grid for 
most of California. 
38 Incorporating the fact that some customers were charged somewhat higher prices during preset peak periods 
than during off-peak periods ("time-of-use" rates) would have little effect on the results, due in part to the 
inelasticity of demand. 
39 Also due to inelastic demand, adjusting for the fact that the prevailing flat rate wasn't exactly equal to the 
level that we calculate would break even given the production technologies makes very little difference in the 
analysis. 
40 During the observed period, the utilities had real-time pricing for only very few customers that were part of 
pilot programs. Many customers—constituting about 15% of total demand—had switched to nonutility retail 
providers, but virtually none of these customers was on RTP either. 
41 We do not consider cross-elasticities between hours, though we do discuss the effect of substitutability 
across hours, i.e., "load shifting," below. 
42 Throughout the simulations, we continue assuming that the customers on RTP in aggregate do not differ in 
their demand profile from those that remain on flat-rate service. 
43 Installation of these meters was not completed until 2004. As of this writing, there is no generally available 
RTP tariff in California. The meters are being used for RTP in only a few small pilot programs. 
44 Some vendors, however, have suggested that the use of cellular technology for communicating with the 
meters creates large density economies, and that rollout in densely populated areas can actually pay for itself by 
reducing labor costs in meter reading. 
45 This .001% would represent a customer with a peak demand of about 450kW. In California, there are 
approximately 8,000 customers of at least this size. 
46 Like much of the peak-load pricing literature, we have made simplifying assumptions. We have extended the 
model to nonzero cross-elasticities above. Relaxing other assumptions, as we intend to do in future work, is 
unlikely to alter the basic insights of this analysis. 
47 The flat rate we've studied is not specific to electricity markets and can represent any requirements contract, 
i.e., a contract where a firm agrees to supply any quantity demanded at a specified price. Our results suggest 
that requirements contracts may have greater adverse-efficiency effects than is generally recognized. 
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